In this paper we analyze how to improve the benefits of n producers when: (1) each producer i faces a linear production problem given by max{c
Introduction
In the classical paper by Owen (1975) , the linear programming games are first introduced and analyzed. These games model linear production situations in which a group of players, each of them facing a linear production problem, agree to join their resources and to centralize their production, in order to improve their benefits. This approach implicitly assumes that the producers dismantle their production facilities and transfer their resources to a unique active production plant. Nevertheless, it is easy to imagine that dismantling facilities is not always feasible, mainly because of social side-effects, like unemployment or social disorders. In addition, it is not necessarily optimal. There are cases, see our Example 3.1, where centralizing all the resources is not a good deal. The centralized approach to linear production has been also used to study more general models in papers like Granot (1986) or Curiel, Derks, and Tijs (1989) .
In order to search for a compromise between improving the benefits and preserving the production capabilities of the different producers, it is interesting to perform the analysis of non-centralized production models. In Fernández et al. (2003) producers look for a division of their total surpluses, after each of them has implemented a particular optimal production plan. Kalai and Zemel (1982) and Feltkamp et al. (1993) have considered other variations of decentralized linear production situations.
Our approach in this paper looks for an optimal allocation of the resources, improving or at least maintaining the individual optimal benefits of each producer. More explicitly, we consider a situation with n producers of the same goods, with different linear technologies and prices. The producers can trade their resources with the following two constrains: (1) they cannot shut down their production plants, and (2) each production plant should, at worst, maintain its benefits after the trade. Both such constrains aim to avoid negative social side-effects produced by the total or partial dismantling of one or more plants. We propose several approaches to analyzing this situation. The first one (Section 2) assumes that producers behave non-cooperatively. This means that each agent individually requests a portion of the total resources (such that he improves his initial benefits). The goal is to identify those claims leading to Nash equilibria. Also, we give some conditions for the existence of two refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept that we previously introduce. In the second approach (Section 3), producers are supposed to act cooperatively and, moreover, it is assumed that every allocation of the total gains is possible. If a coalition is formed, its members share their resources in order to maximize the sum of their benefits, while improving or, at worst, maintaining the benefits in all their plants. Our purpose, in this second analysis is to identify some core allocation, and to establish the relationship between the payoff of some Nash equilibria of the non-cooperative case with the imputations arising in the cooperative situation. Finally, we analyze the non-transferable utility case (Section 4), where agents cooperate but there are some restrictions for the distribution of the joint benefits. In this context we provide some examples and some results regarding the core of the corresponding NTU game.
The non-cooperative analysis
Let us consider a set N = {1, . . . , n} of producers. For each agent i ∈ N we denote by A i ∈ R p×q , c i ∈ R q , and b i ∈ R p the technology matrix, the unit selling price vector and the resource bundle, respectively. We assume that all the elements of A i , c i and b i are non-negative. Under our hypothesis of linear production technologies, the optimal individual production policy for agent i ∈ N is obtained solving the problem:
